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n a sultry spring night in 2001, wildlife photographer 
Brian Call was heading home from the back reaches 
of south Florida’s Fakahatchee Strand. As usual, he 
saw no sign of the forested swampland’s rarest inhabitants, 
the black bear and Florida panther—until he spotted a young 
panther, twisted and mangled in the middle of State Road 
29. As Call sat beside the lifeless, still-warm body, he heard a 
chirping sound. “I ﬁ  nally realized,” he remembers, “it was the 
mother calling out.” 
The mother’s distress was even greater than Call imagined. 
The photographer laid the dead panther in the grass where 
he thought the mother was hiding, then reported the death 
to the state wildlife commission. Another panther had been 
run over just 300 feet away earlier that night, he was told. The 
panthers were ten-month-old siblings.
The Florida panther is one of the rarest mammals in the 
world, with an estimated population of 80 (Figure 1). About 
half of the panther’s current range—just over 3 million 
acres—is on private land. The biggest threat to its survival is 
habitat loss. Southern Florida lost over 1.8 million acres of 
forest between 1935 and 1995 and gained 11,000 miles of 
public roads in just 12 years (1991 to 2003, the last year for 
which statistics are available). Vehicle collisions alone have 
killed 66 panthers since 1972, when the state started keeping 
track. Half of these deaths have occurred since 2000. But even 
more panthers die from wounds sustained during battles over 
ever-shrinking territories.
The fate of the panther rests with the US Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS), the federal agency charged with using 
the “best available science” to make sure the panther has 
enough habitat to ﬁ  nd mates, hunt, disperse to new home 
ranges, and persist as a population. But the FWS was recently 
forced to acknowledge that, far from the best science, it 
has been using ﬂ  awed science to regulate development 
in panther habitat. The agency’s admission comes on 
the heels of rising tensions and internal disputes, which 
reached a crisis point soon after the formation of a new 
panther recovery subteam in 2000 (the panther subteam of 
Multi-Species/Ecosystem Recovery Implementation Team 
[MERIT]). Although most members of the MERIT subteam 
questioned the science behind FWS policy decisions, the 
agency had decades of peer-reviewed literature on its side, 
much of it published by a single researcher—David Maehr, a 
fellow recovery subteam member. 
The FWS continued to defend its policies despite the 
subteam members’ vigorous protests and a lawsuit by 
environmental groups, which included court declarations 
from the dissenting team members. Finally, as arguments 
grew more personalized and entrenched—and after Andrew 
Eller, a veteran FWS biologist who worked on panther 
recovery for a decade, had publicly rebuked his agency for 
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Figure 1. The Florida Panther National Wildlife Refuge Harbors One 
of the Rarest Animals in the World
Just 80 Florida panthers remain in the wild—up from 30–50 animals in 
1995. This critically endangered, wide-ranging carnivore faces the same 
problem that places endangered species at risk worldwide: fragmented, 
degraded, and vanishing habitat. Florida paves over 450 acres of green 
space a day, forcing panthers onto deadly roads and triggering often-
fatal territorial battles over smaller and smaller ranges. 
(Photo: US Fish and Wildlife Service)PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org 1526
inﬂ  ating panther numbers and misrepresenting the animal’s 
habitat requirements—the agency called in an independent 
review team. 
When the Scientiﬁ  c Review Team (SRT) analyzed 25 
years and 3,000 pages of panther science, it discovered 
“fatal ﬂ  aws” in FWS models used to evaluate habitat use and 
predict extinction risk. The FWS was making decisions that 
could place the critically endangered panther at risk without 
scientiﬁ  c justiﬁ  cation. Unsound methodologies, the SRT 
reported, had passed peer review unchallenged. “Because of 
ﬂ  aws in the system, we may have taken lands that we can’t give 
back to the species,” says reviewer Howard Quigley, an expert 
on carnivore ecology and the executive director of Beringia 
South, an ecology research and educational institute. 
Whether those “fatal ﬂ  aws” had deadly consequences is in 
dispute. Meanwhile, scientists and policymakers must grapple 
with a more fundamental question: what happened to the 
“best available science”?
Tracking a Secretive Species
In many ways, the story of the Florida panther (Puma concolor 
coryi) echoes that of every other large carnivore. Fearful 
settlers seeking revenge for lost livestock, and bounty hunters 
anxious to claim a $5 reward, killed panthers at every 
opportunity during the late 1800s and early 1900s. Extirpated 
from 95% of their historic range throughout the southeastern 
United States, panthers were reduced to a single, isolated 
population in southwest Florida by the 1950s (Figure 2). By 
1967, state biologists thought they were gone there too. But 
in 1972, biologists found an old female, and the panther was 
listed as endangered when the federal Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) passed in 1973. 
When the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission (FWC) 
formally started monitoring panthers in 1981, very little was 
known about the animal’s biology. Because panthers, like 
cougars, pumas, and mountain lions (all describe the same 
subspecies), are shy and rarely seen during the day, capture 
teams used hounds to track their scent and chase them 
into trees. Once treed, cats were darted, collected with nets 
or rope, and then examined and tagged with radio collars 
while sedated. Radio telemetry provided data on location, 
range, behavior, and mortality (indicated by signal changes), 
and helped biologists study the health, social structure, and 
distribution of the population (Figure 3).
David Maehr inherited two radio-collared animals 
when he signed on as leader of the FWC project in 1985 
and quickly established himself as the foremost panther 
authority. At that time, Maehr says, the population was 
considered old, parasite-infested, and ready to expire at 
any minute. When Maehr left the FWC in 1994 to work on 
his PhD, 54 panthers had been radio-collared, with about a 
dozen animals under study at a time. 
Radio-telemetry data on 43 collared animals collected from 
1981 to 1991 guided government agencies’ ﬁ  rst attempt to 
deﬁ  ne panther habitat in a 1993 habitat preservation plan. To 
qualify as high-quality habitat, an area had to be large enough 
to “support several panthers.” It also had to be contiguous 
with occupied range and contain signiﬁ  cant forest cover, few 
residences, and few highways. Based on the telemetry data, 
forests got highest priority while less-forested public lands in 
Big Cypress National Preserve and Everglades National Park 
were considered less suitable. The notion of forest dependency 
was further developed by Maehr and James Cox, in a 1995 
peer-reviewed Conservation Biology paper that would lay the 
foundation for future FWS decisions in panther habitat.
This paper and the inferences it supported placed Maehr 
at the center of controversy and eventually cost Andrew Eller 
his job. And when the SRT reported that the “most inﬂ  uential 
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Figure 2. The Historic and Current Range of the Florida Panther 
The “Florida” panther is really a misnomer, experts say. This mountain lion subspecies once inhabited most of the southeastern United States, north 
to Tennessee and west to Texas—until human persecution and encroachment extirpated the panther from 95% of its historic range. The modern 
Florida panther is an artifact of these forces. Genetic drift and inbreeding led to the cat’s trademark crooked tail and other unique characteristics, while 
unchecked development eliminated the panther from every area but southwest Florida—the last place to be developed.
(Illustration: Rusty Howson)PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org 1527
paper on panther habitat use” contained four fatally ﬂ  awed 
inferences, the scientiﬁ  c foundation on which an imperiled 
species’s survival depended began to crumble.
“It was put in very strong language that panthers are forest 
obligates and wouldn’t move across more than a 90-meter 
(about 300 feet) gap of non-forest,” marvels SRT reviewer 
Paul Beier, a mountain lion expert. Considering that the 
average home range for a male is 200 square miles, Beier 
adds, “this was a very improbable conclusion.” 
Maehr and Cox’s conclusions were problematic for a variety 
of reasons. The researchers presented 14,500 locations from 41 
radio-collared panthers, but analyzed only 8,600 locations for 
23 animals—without acknowledging doing so. “They excluded 
animals that were out in the swampland and then came to the 
conclusion that panthers only used forest,” Beier says.
Also at issue was the telemetry data itself. “They were 
taking telemetry observations from airplanes with known 
positional errors on the order of 200 to 300 meters or more 
and then making claims about habitat use at 100 meters,” says 
reviewer Michael Conroy, a population ecologist with the US 
Geological Service in Georgia. “You simply can’t do that.”
But the biggest problem, says reviewer Michael Vaughan, 
was that all the readings were taken during the day, and 
panthers are nocturnal. “Most of their feeding activity is at 
night, they’re hunting at night, and using other areas that 
they don’t use during the day,” says Vaughan, an expert on 
large carnivore ecology with the US Geological Service in 
Virginia. Maehr and Cox extrapolated their daytime data to 
24 hours a day, he explains. And, echoing Conroy, he adds: 
“You can’t do that.”
“It’s unfortunate that this paper was published in a peer-
reviewed journal,” Vaughan says. “Once it’s peer-reviewed 
people tend to take it as gospel. But the peer-review process 
was bad.” 
Since Maehr either authored or coauthored some 75% 
of the habitat-related research on the Florida panther, 
his reputation has taken a beating and his work has lost 
credibility. He admits that mistakes were made in data 
analysis, but defends his conclusions. “One of the studies that 
we did in terms of great cost in manpower and discomfort in 
the ﬁ  eld was to go out and actively monitor animals around a 
24-hour period,” he says. By counting the tip-switch changes 
in radio collars, Maehr says, he could tell whether an animal 
was active or not, and found that panthers are crepuscular—
most active around sunrise and sunset. 
Maehr says there was nothing to suggest that panthers 
abandoned places they occupied during the day or 
exhibited patterns different from those suggested by “tens of 
thousands” of radio locations collected during the day, which 
he says included the panther’s most active periods. “The 
bottom line is that those data do reﬂ  ect a 24-hour cycle of 
activity and habitat use.”
One of the researchers on the MERIT panther subteam, 
however, argues that the 24-hour monitoring study showed 
only peaks of activity and did not identify habitats associated 
with locations. “Tip-switch data record head movement,” 
says Jane Comiskey, a researcher at the Institute for 
Environmental Modeling at the University of Tennessee 
and a vocal critic of Maehr’s work. In conﬁ  ned trials, she 
explains, many times walking isn’t recorded because there is 
no head movement; on the other hand, many activities that 
accompany head movement, such as feeding and grooming, 
occur when the animal isn’t walking. 
Despite all the problems in the 1995 paper, its 
conclusions—panthers are forest obligates that will not 
cross 90 meters of unforested landscape—would form the 
cornerstone of a habitat evaluation model used during FWS 
development permit consultations. Since 1995, the FWS has 
approved permits for 35 development projects impacting 
38,484 acres in and around panther habitat.
Deconstructing the Panther Landscape 
Under Section 7 of the ESA, federal agencies must consult 
with the FWS to make sure their activities don’t jeopardize 
the habitat or survival of threatened or endangered species. 
In panther country, most consultations involve US Army 
Corps permits to destroy wetlands for urban and agricultural 
development. The FWS writes biological opinions that assess 
the impacts of development and identify ways developers 
can mitigate these impacts—by preserving acreage elsewhere 
on the property or offsite, for example. In 1998, Eller and 
his coworkers had determined that a Lee County, Florida, 
Department of Transportation project called the Daniels 
Parkway extension would degrade 1,540 habitat acres and 
that the county could mitigate by preserving 250 acres 
elsewhere. The county disagreed, and in 1999 paid $317,000 
to Dawson and Associates, a Washington, D. C., lobbying 
ﬁ  rm that represents Florida development and agricultural 
interests, to “advise and assist Lee County in obtaining more 
timely resolution and signiﬁ  cantly more reasonable terms 
in the federal permit for [the] Daniels Parkway extension,” 
according to a purchase order obtained from Lee County.
That same year, during a Section 7 consultation on 
Daniels Parkway, Maehr presented a new habitat evaluation 
model to the FWS. Maehr, working as a consultant for 
Lee County, developed the model with Jonathan Deason, 
a professor of environmental and energy management at 
George Washington University. Deason is also listed as a 
senior advisor to Dawson and Associates. The model, called 
the Panther Habitat Evaluation Model (PHEM), estimates 
functionally equivalent panther habitat units based on 
weighted scores for six habitat factors. The PHEM score 
determines habitat impacts and corresponding mitigation. 
Seventy-ﬁ  ve percent of the score is based on four factors: land 
vegetation type (hardwood hammock forest gets the highest 
value), forest patch size, proximity to forest (the 90-meter 
rule), and proximity to a population core. All four factors 
were based on what the SRT called ﬂ  awed inferences in the 
1995 paper. 
The same week PHEM was presented, Senator Slade 
Gorton (Republican, Washington)—a proponent of scaling 
back ESA habitat protections—quietly inserted a rider 
into the 2000 Department of the Interior appropriations 
bill directing the FWS “to work cooperatively with the Lee 
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County, Florida, Department of Transportation to ensure 
that measures designed to minimize the impacts on the 
Florida panther related to the Daniels Parkway extension are 
reasonable and conceived properly.” 
Although the language in the rider “sounded innocuous,” 
Eller says, “we knew it meant accept PHEM or else.” When 
FWS biologists were asked to evaluate PHEM, Eller says, they 
decided it should not be used in permit decisions. A major 
problem with PHEM is that it starts with an ideal 500-hectare 
(two square miles) patch of oak hammock that’s less than 90 
meters from the nearest forest patch, says Eller. “If habitat 
didn’t match that ideal, then the score was lowered. But 
nothing in the areas of concern matches that description.”
The FWS biologists wrote a letter intended for Maehr 
explaining the problems, Eller says, but the letter wasn’t 
sent until about three months after consultation on Daniels 
Parkway concluded. In the end, based on PHEM, the agency 
preserved just 94 acres—less than 40% of what the biologists 
recommended based on their own models.
Essential steps were skipped by developing an impact-
assessment model based on daytime panther locations, 
observes Comiskey. Because only the most frequently used 
lands merit mitigation under PHEM, much of the forest of 
southwest Florida didn’t qualify. “In the Daniels Parkway 
extension, only 11% of the forest on the project site qualiﬁ  ed 
based on the rules for patch sizes, proximity to other patches 
and the [population] core, forest type, and connectivity,” 
Comiskey says. And because of the 90-meter rule, no 
mitigation was required for the largest forest patch. 
“It’s damaging to the credibility of the authors, the 
journals, and the reviewers who approved the papers to have 
published sensitive methodologies that could put a highly 
endangered animal at risk without scientiﬁ  c justiﬁ  cation,” 
Comiskey says. “Especially when potential conﬂ  icts of interest 
are involved.”
Maehr brushes aside suggestions of conﬂ  ict, insisting that 
he worked with developers to ﬁ  nd creative ways of dealing 
with development and to convince landowners that having 
a panther on their land would be an asset, not a liability. 
“You’re not going to make it an asset by pounding private 
landowners over the head with the panther.” 
And Maehr says he never intended that PHEM become 
the “agency standard” for permit review: “We viewed it as a 
step in a process that would lead to a better approach.” He 
concedes that the 1995 paper failed to explain why Everglades 
panthers were excluded. But it was reasonable to do that, he 
argues, because the Everglades population appeared to be 
in the “ﬁ  nal throes of extinction” and the open expanses of 
southeastern Florida were “atypical and unsuitable” habitat.
Analytical problems aside, Maehr defends his conclusions. 
“All evidence continues to point to the critical nature of 
forest,” he says, adding that it’s dangerous to say that areas 
with little forest, like the Everglades, provide “excellent” 
panther habitat. “This almost jihad-like insistence that 
panthers are generalists is [argued] so the panther becomes 
this wonderful umbrella to block any efforts to continue to 
develop south Florida,” Maehr says.
Yet arguing that the panther is a forest obligate, critics say, 
safeguards only forest. “We all agree that removal of forest 
impacts panthers,” Comiskey says. “What we disagree about 
is whether development of other land covers also impacts 
panthers.”
In southern Florida, forest cover often occurs in scattered 
tree islands separated by open prairies, marshes, shrubland, 
and saw palmetto thickets interspersed with agricultural 
and improved pasture lands. “I went into consultation after 
consultation arguing with both consultants and the [US 
Army] Corps who said that the only habitat that needed to be 
compensated was forested,” says Eller. 
In 2002, Eller began to accuse his agency of using ﬂ  awed 
science and pressuring biologists to rewrite biological 
opinions to favor development. Development is outpacing 
habitat protection by one and a half times, Eller says. When 
he noted that trend in a biological opinion, however, “they 
took that information out.” 
With help from Public Employees for Environmental 
Responsibility (better known as PEER), Eller sued the 
Department of the Interior (the FWS is a bureau in this 
department) under the Data Quality Act in June 2004 for using 
unsound science. That November, after 17 years with the FWS, 
Eller was ﬁ  red for not meeting deadlines and “unprofessional 
exchanges with the public,” among other charges. 
Since 1999, the FWS has issued 29 biological opinions 
for development permits in or near panther habitat. “A 
lot of land was developed that likely would not have been 
developed had these ﬂ  awed inferences not appeared in those 
publications,” says SRT reviewer Vaughan. “And they were 
calling this the ‘best available science.’ ”
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Figure 3. Collecting Valuable Data from a Sedated Panther
After ensuring a panther has survived the ordeal of treeing and capture 
unscathed, a team of state and federal wildlife biologists examines the 
cat and collects samples for laboratory analysis. Cats are also dewormed 
and vaccinated. A saline drip keeps the animal hydrated while the team 
collects skin for genetic analysis, hair to measure mercury exposure, 
and blood to check for diseases. The FWS fears that a recent outbreak of 
feline leukemia in the Okaloacoochee Slough population could trigger 
accelerated extinction. 
(Photo: US Fish and Wildlife Service)
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In March, outgoing FWS Director Steve Williams upheld 
Eller’s data quality challenge, and admitted the agency used 
ﬂ  awed science. In a letter to PEER, Williams wrote that he 
ordered the FWS regional director to “immediately update 
the panther-related sections” of a multi-species recovery 
plan and “incorporate appropriate recommendations of 
the SRT.” Williams also acknowledged that the agency 
mistakenly equated veriﬁ  ed population with minimum viable 
population—the number required for persistence. Again, 
these assumptions were traced to one journal article. In June 
2005, Eller was reinstated by the FWS, after both parties 
reached an out-of-court agreement. 
Driving the Panther into a Genetic Bottleneck
Until the early 1900s, the Florida panther (P. concolor coryi) 
crossbred with the Texas puma (P. concolor stanleyana), along 
with two other now-extinct races, where their ranges once 
overlapped. (The Florida and Texas subspecies shared a 
common border along the western edges of Louisiana and 
Arkansas.) Once isolated, panthers suffered inbreeding 
depression. Some external anomalies like cowlicks and 
crooked tails aren’t likely to have serious effects on ﬁ  tness. 
But heart defects, susceptibility to heavy parasite loads, and 
reproductive abnormalities—including poor sperm quality and 
undescended testicles—could prove devastating. “Geneticists 
were telling us the cats were so inbred they would probably 
only survive another 25 to 40 years,” says Eller. Population 
estimates in the 1990s hovered around 30 to 50 animals.
In an effort to revitalize the population, the FWS released 
eight female Texas cougars into unoccupied panther ranges 
in 1995. But a group of papers on panther genetics and 
demography questioned the need for introducing outside 
genes, called genetic introgression. The papers claimed 
that even though observed defects likely had a genetic 
basis, they had minor impacts on individual and population 
ﬁ  tness. The introgression experiment generated signiﬁ  cant 
controversy, SRT reviewer Quigley says, with one side saying 
the population was vigorous and a variety of others saying 
it wasn’t and that introgression was critical to the panther’s 
survival. There’s a legitimate argument to be made against 
introgression from an evolutionary standpoint, Quigley says: 
“If there’s any indication that an endangered species can be 
recovered without watering down the original genetic stock, 
then we should be willing to do that.” 
But in this case, he says, the question boiled down to 
whether the population was on the verge of extinction and 
needed introgression as a last resort. And the goal of the 
introgression experiment was to mimic historic gene ﬂ  ow, not 
to replace or swamp the panther gene pool. The argument 
against introgression suggested the population was vigorous 
and so introgression was unwarranted. “The claims were 
that the populations were doing pretty well prior to the 
introduction of Texas cougars,” says the SRT’s Conroy.
The review team traced evidence for arguments against 
genetic introgression to “one graph and four sentences” in 
a 1995 Conservation Biology paper coauthored by Maehr and 
Gerard Caddick. In the paper, the authors interpreted a 
ﬁ  gure that plotted births against deaths per year as evidence 
of a robust population. But the SRT found a problem with 
mortality detection (kittens under four months weren’t 
radio-collared and couldn’t contribute to total deaths). And 
because it wasn’t clear that births and deaths (presented as 
raw numbers) corresponded to the same population base, the 
SRT concluded, the graph couldn’t support inferences about 
per-capita vital rates or population growth rates. 
Growth-rate estimates are one parameter used in 
population viability analyses (PVAs) to predict extinction risk. 
Another is kitten survival—estimated at 84% to 87% in the 
Maehr and Caddick paper. The SRT called the estimate—
presented with no underlying data—“indefensible,” 
citing a more recent data-supported estimate of 52% 
for pure panthers. The team also wrote that it would be 
unprecedented in vertebrate studies for kitten survival to 
exceed adult survival, which was estimated at 82%. (Maehr 
sees no problem with kitten survival exceeding adult survival. 
“We were talking about kitten survival through one year of 
age, when they’re protected by their mothers.”) 
The kitten survival estimates were used in a PVA—peer 
reviewed and published in a 2002 University of Chicago 
book—that the FWS used to assess panther viability. Using 
the unsupported kitten survival rate, the 2002 PVA estimated 
extinction risk at 0%. The analysis also failed to model 
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Figure 4. Development Projects in Panther Habitat Since 2000
In a 2002 landscape conservation strategy, members of the MERIT 
panther recovery subteam identiﬁ  ed lands essential to the long-term 
survival of the Florida panther. The MERIT subteam deﬁ  ned the Primary 
Zone (dark blue) as “all lands essential for the survival of the Florida 
panther in the wild.” The Secondary Zone (light blue) includes “lands 
contiguous with the Primary Zone, and areas which panthers may 
currently use, and where expansion of the Florida panther population 
is most likely to occur.” Maintaining the integrity and connectivity of 
the Primary Zone, which includes both public and private lands, is one 
of the highest priorities for panther survival, the subteam determined. 
It also stressed the importance of avoiding “land-use intensiﬁ  cation” in 
the Secondary Zone, as well as in areas that panthers use to disperse. Yet 
development continues. Since 2000, the FWS has written 27 biological 
opinions (red) evaluating the impacts of Florida development projects in 
panther habitat. (This map does not include biological opinions written 
in 2005.) 
(Illustration: Brad Nunley/National Wildlife Federation)PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org 1530
the effects of changes in habitat or genetic restoration on 
extinction risk, the SRT reported, assuming they would have 
none. “Clearly,” the team wrote, “some combination of these 
changes caused extinction risk to plummet from 100% to 
about 0%.” It was this model that Eller cited when criticizing 
his agency for “pretending there’s a surplus of panthers.”
The unreliable inferences about panther demography 
“muddled the debate” about the viability of the population, 
the SRT wrote, adding “unwarranted credibility” to 
arguments against genetic restoration. By most accounts, the 
cross-breeding experiment reinvigorated the population. 
Hybrids have a higher kitten survival rate than pure panthers, 
and hybrids show a dramatic decrease in the prevalence 
of abnormalities. “So far it looks like this experiment is 
working,” Quigley says, “but the review team felt there wasn’t 
enough genetic monitoring going on.”
The SRT report urges management agencies to collect 
genetic data and study the impacts of genetic restoration 
on individual traits and demographic vigor. “The Florida 
panther story promises to be the best documented 
example of the relevance (or irrelevance) of genetics 
to conservation,” the team wrote. “Future conservation 
decisions deserve to be informed by the results of the 
panther introgression experiment.”
Recovering the Panther—And Scientiﬁ  c Integrity
In June, a healthy three-year-old male panther was killed on 
an interstate highway in northeastern Florida, 350 miles from 
known panther range. FWC ofﬁ  cials think he wandered up 
from south Florida in search of a mate. “With more roads, 
more people, and more development, panthers are being 
squeezed out of their ranges and forced to go north,” says 
FWC spokesperson Karen Parker. 
Panther habitat is shrinking at a rate of nearly 1% a year. 
If that trend continues, 500,000 more acres—over 15% 
of all remaining panther habitat—will vanish in 25 years. 
Nothing suggests the trend will change (Figure 4). In 2006, 
developers hope to ﬁ  nish construction on a new city and 
Catholic university called Ave Maria. The project, which the 
FWS estimates will impact nearly 5,000 acres, is sited right 
next to the Florida Panther National Wildlife Refuge along 
SR29, where photographer Brian Call found the road-killed 
panther. “If the FWS isn’t going to write a jeopardy opinion 
or recommend the [US Army] Corps deny a permit for 
something like Ave Maria,” says Eller, “the sky’s the limit.”
When a population drops below 500, conservation biologists 
start to worry about extinction. With fewer than 100 panthers 
left, every animal counts. Yet the FWS assumed there were 
plenty of panthers and development could proceed anywhere 
except forests. How could the scientiﬁ  c review process go 
so wrong with so much at stake? “We just were not policing 
ourselves well,” says the SRT’s Quigley. “Up until seven 
years ago there wasn’t anyone questioning the science that 
was coming out in the publications. There was just one 
very proliﬁ  c scientist.” What scientists should be doing is 
developing new knowledge and adjusting current views in a 
healthy exchange of ideas, he adds. “What we see in this case 
is a program that became so entrenched in territoriality that 
the kind of vibrant free exchange of ideas just didn’t happen.” 
While peer review is not without its problems—unsound 
interpretations and conclusions slip through the process 
from time to time—the case of the panther is unusual in that 
the peer-review process failed to catch such seriously ﬂ  awed 
inferences in science used to manage an endangered species. 
When the two Conservation Biology papers were published 
in 1995, though Maehr was considered the panther expert, 
he had only just started his doctoral work. Why didn’t more 
senior scientists ﬂ  ag the problems in the review process? 
“Peer reviewers have to rely on what the authors report in 
their paper,” says Reed Noss, editor of Conservation Biology at 
the time the papers were published and Davis-Shine Professor 
of Conservation Biology at the University of Central Florida. 
“Ultimately the onus is on the authors to use all the available 
data [for example] or explain why certain data were excluded 
from the analysis.” 
“I think there were deﬁ  nitely questionable interpretations 
of the data,” Noss says. “Whether it was intentional or just a 
mistake, it’s hard to say.” But peer review will never be able 
to uncover all these kinds of methodological problems, Noss 
explains, because with so much competition for space in 
the journals the details of the methods don’t appear in the 
articles. “The word limits keep getting lower and lower. You 
would have to do what this independent team of reviewers did 
and go to the original data. There’s no way a peer reviewer is 
ever going to have time to do that.”
The shortcomings in peer review underscore the 
importance of having open review and independent 
scientiﬁ  c review panels like the SRT, Noss says, and like 
those mandated by California law. Unlike the federal ESA, 
California law requires independent scientiﬁ  c review at 
several stages of the conservation planning process, “so 
consultants working for counties or developers are not able 
to get away with using ﬂ  awed scientiﬁ  c methodologies,” says 
Noss. “And quality control is assured all the way through the 
process.” It’s what the agencies should have been doing all 
along for the panther, he adds. “They shouldn’t have waited 
until a couple of years ago to have an independent scientiﬁ  c 
review of such a high-proﬁ  le, controversial, and highly 
endangered species.”
So why doesn’t the FWS vet the science it uses to manage 
endangered species as a matter of course? “We certainly have 
a vetting process, but science evolves, so we have to constantly 
reevaluate what we use,” says Paul Souza, an FWS assistant 
ﬁ  eld supervisor. “We can always do better, but our process is 
a good one. Our biologists are on the front lines of research 
and with the help of these groups like the SRT and MERIT, 
we’re identifying problems and gaps in the science,” Souza 
says. “We just revised a biological opinion on Ave Maria when 
we realized we had [underestimated] the value of a panther 
corridor important for dispersal along Camp Keais Strand,” 
he adds. The project will change a two-lane rural road into 
a four-lane urban highway. In the revised opinion, the FWS 
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determined that a wildlife crossing should be built to offset 
the expected impacts of increased motor trafﬁ  c and reduce 
the number of road-kill incidents. Souza says the agency will 
soon begin meeting with FWC ofﬁ  cials and panther scientists 
to review the SRT recommendations and determine what 
ﬁ  ndings should be incorporated into agency decisions.
To guard against future breakdowns in the system, the SRT 
wrote an article recommending ways to improve peer review 
and ensure science-based conservation. The team also wrote 
a summary of the problems found in the panther literature. 
Both reports are in press at the Journal of Wildlife Management. 
One recommendation involves using an independent 
scientiﬁ  c advisory committee to vet the credibility of each 
piece of evidence used in a recovery effort, says Quigley. 
“That was not done with the Florida panther, and you can see 
where it ended.” 
Many ﬂ  aws can be corrected by rigorous reanalysis of 
existing datasets. “There’s a difference between being 
wrong and being unreliable,” SRT reviewer Beier says. “The 
scientiﬁ  c process that yielded certain conclusions wasn’t 
sound. We’re not sure whether the conclusions are right or 
wrong.” A robust model for evaluating panther habitat use 
can be developed from reanalyzing the existing data, he says, 
including the data omitted from panthers in the Everglades, 
and by collecting better data on nighttime use. And better 
measures of reproductive success and age-speciﬁ  c survival will 
yield better population models, says reviewer Vaughan. “We 
need to go back and get more data to get a better handle on 
kitten survival. Then you can model population growth and 
reproductive rates.”
One thing is certain. The panther will not survive if it is 
relegated to a single, isolated population in south Florida. 
One of the most urgent needs is to identify some of the best 
release sites for panther reintroduction, Beier says, “develop 
a plan for release, and follow through on it. We need some 
science for that and we need a whole lot of political will.”
Developing reliable methods of studying low-density, 
elusive carnivores like the panther will help wildlife biologists 
better understand and manage other endangered species. 
And preserving habitat for the Florida panther provides 
protection for all the species that share its range—a group 
that includes 52 state and federally listed species. “Habitat 
conservation does require that certain areas don’t turn 
into housing tracts,” says Beier. That’s why it’s essential to 
start with a sound scientiﬁ  c foundation. Once you build a 
shopping mall or golf course in prime habitat for a wide-
ranging species, you can’t reclaim that land if you discover 
you made a mistake. Everyone knows the panther needs 
habitat more than anything else, Quigley says, so “it’s best to 
err on the conservative side” when mistakes could threaten 
the survival of a species. “And that’s why it’s so vital to ﬁ  x the 
ﬂ  aws in the system,” he says. “So it won’t happen again.”  
Further Reading
Beier P, Vaughan M, Conroy M, Quigley H (2003 December) Analysis of 
scientiﬁ  c literature related to the Florida panther. Tallahassee (Florida): 
Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Bureau of Wildlife 
Diversity Conservation. Available: http:⁄⁄www.myfwc.com/critters/panther/
Beier-Panther-SRT.pdf. Accessed 25 July 2005.
Beier P, Vaughan M, Conroy M, Quigley H (2005) Deconstructing ﬂ  awed 
scientiﬁ  c inferences about the Florida panther. J Wildl Manage. In press.
Belden RC, Hagedorn BW (1993) Feasibility of translocating panthers into 
northern Florida. J Wildl Manage 57: 388–397.
Comiskey EJ, Bass OL Jr, Gross LJ, McBride RT, Salinas R (2002) Panthers 
and forests in south Florida: An ecological perspective. Conserv Ecol 6: 18. 
Available: http:⁄⁄www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol6/iss1/art18/print.pdf. 
Accessed 25 July 2005.
Conroy M, Beier P, Quigley H, Vaughan M (2005) Improving the use of science 
in conservation: Lessons from the Florida panther. J Wildl Manage. In press. 
Hedrick PW (1995) Gene ﬂ  ow and genetic restoration: The Florida panther as 
a case study. Conserv Biol 9: 996–1007.
Maehr DS, Caddick GB (1995) Demographics and genetic introgression in the 
Florida panther. Conserv Biol 9: 1295–1298.
Maehr DS, Cox JA (1995) Landscape features and panthers in Florida. Conserv 
Biol 9: 1008–1019.
Maehr DS, Deason JP (2002) Wide-ranging carnivores and development 
permits: Constructing a multi-scale model to evaluate impacts on the Florida 
panther. Clean Technol Environ Policy 3: 398–406. Available: http://www.
gwu.edu/~eemnews/spring2002/documents/pdfarticle_deason.pdf. 
Accessed 25 July 2005.
Land D, Cunningham M, Lotz M, Shindle D (2001 September 25) Annual 
report: Florida panther genetic restoration and management. Tallahassee 
(Florida): Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission. Available: 
http:⁄⁄www.panther.state.ﬂ  .us/news/pdf/2000-01panthergeneticrestoration
annualreport1.pdf. Accessed 25 July 2005.
Shrader-Frechette K (2004) Measurement problems and Florida panther 
models. Southeast Nat 3: 37–50. Available: http:⁄⁄www.nd.edu/~kshrader/
panther-models-sen-2004.pdf. Accessed 25 July 2005.
Note Added in Proof
The version of this paper that was ﬁ  rst made available on 23 August 2005 
has been replaced by this, the deﬁ  nitive, version.
September 2005  |  Volume 3  |  Issue 9  |  e333